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PANEL I: Monsanto v. Scruggs: The
Scope of Downstream
Licensing Restrictions
John Richards ∗
Mark R. Patterson †
Richard B. Ulmer Jr. ‡
Peter Carstensen §
Jay P. Kesan ||
MR. RUBIN: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. My name
is Jay Rubin. I am the editor-in-chief of the Fordham Intellectual
Property Journal. I want to thank you all for coming.
Moderator:
Panelists:

I also want to thank our panelists and the faculty, Profs.
Hansen, Katyal, Richards, and Patterson, who have participated
today.
I want to thank Helen Herman and her administrative staff for
helping us put this together. I also want to thank my editorial
board and staff, and especially Brian Danitz, for really putting an
outstanding program together today.
To introduce our program and to welcome us, we are graced by
Dean Treanor. Also I want to thank him for his participation and
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support, for us to be able to put a symposium together every year.
Thank you.
Here is Dean Treanor.
DEAN TREANOR: Thanks very much, Jay. Welcome.
One of our great strengths at Fordham is intellectual property
law. I am really delighted about that.
In the summer of 1981, when I was a summer associate, I was
working for a big law firm, and I was the first summer associate
they had ever assigned to intellectual property. They didn’t have
enough for me to do, so I wound up mostly doing antitrust. That,
for me, captures—now, intellectual property is a mainstay for all of
the big firms and so many specialty firms—it really captures how,
in a quarter of a century, intellectual property has really moved to
the center of law.
We are very fortunate at Fordham to have faculty who are so
strongly at the cutting edge. I would like to recognize in particular
Prof. Mark Patterson, who will be on the first panel, Prof. Katyal,
Prof. Hansen, all of whom will be part of the program today and
are really part of what I think is one of the most impressive
intellectual property faculties in the country. We have increasingly
stressed that area. This year we started for the first time a graduate
program in intellectual property and information law, which is a
terrific, terrific program, and, again, really highlights how much at
the core of Fordham’s operations intellectual property is.
One of our gems is our journal. The Intellectual Property Law
Journal is really, year in and year out, one of the leading fora for
the discussion of cutting-edge intellectual property issues in
general. These symposia, year in and year out, take what really are
the most pressing issues and bring together extraordinary
practitioners and faculty members to work through them. So it is
one of our great traditions here. I have to say, this program, I
think, is particularly exciting. It really is dazzling for me to look at
the panelists who have been assembled and the importance of the
topics that you will be looking at today.
I want to recognize the staff of the IPLJ for putting this
together. In particular, I want to recognize Jay, who has done such
a terrific job as editor-in-chief; Managing Editor Ashok Chandra,
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who is just fabulous, as well as being, like myself, a great Harry
Potter fan—we were discussing the new Harry Potter movie on the
way in—and I would particularly like to recognize Brian Danitz,
who just put together the most amazing program.
Without any further ado, let me turn you over to the first panel.
MR. CHANDRA: Hi, all. Yes, I am the Harry Potter fan.
My name is Ashok Chandra, and I am the Managing Editor of
the IPLJ. I am the patent guy at the journal. I will be working at
Cooper & Dunham next fall.
I would like to introduce our panel. Our panelists will discuss
the degree to which patent holders may impose licensing
restrictions on end users.
Our moderator today will be Mr. John Richards. Mr. Richards
is a partner at Ladas & Parry and an adjunct professor here at
Fordham, where he teaches U.S. and international patent law. Mr.
Richards joined Ladas & Parry in 1973 and became partner in
1982. He is the general editor of The Legal Aspects of Introducing
Products to the United States 1 and co-author of Intellectual
Property and the Internal Market of the European Community. 2
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you, Ashok. Good morning.
As Dean Treanor said, when he started off in big firms,
antitrust was up and IP was down. Now we have IP up and
antitrust I am not quite sure where, but I think it is beginning to
come back after a period in the doldrums.
What we are looking at this morning is very much the interface
between antitrust and intellectual property. We have had a number
of criticisms of the patent system over the last few years. This
conference last year looked at some of those. Some of the issues
which come up go to the scope of what you can do with a patent,
what you can do with an invention, how broadly you can get
protection for an invention. Last year we were looking at what you
need to do from the patent side; this year we are looking at what
1

JOHN RICHARDS, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTRODUCING PRODUCTS TO THE U.S. MARKET
(1988).
2
PETER GROVES, TONY MARTINO, CLAIRE MISKIN & JOHN RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE INTERNAL MARKET OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1993).
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you can do in order to get a patent and how broadly the patent can
be—that was last year. This year it is how we can use the patent
and what limitations we have on the use of the patent, in view of
the resurgent antitrust law.
Mark Patterson, who is a full-time professor here, will kick off
with a general overview, and then we will move on to some of the
more specific post-sale use restrictions and issues of that type.
PROF. PATTERSON: [Slide]
Actually, I am not just
providing an overview. I have a few things to say about my view
about the appropriate scope of field-of-use licensing as well. But I
am going to begin with an overview.
[Slide] The practice of field-of-use licensing involves the
licensing of patents under a contract or license that imposes
restrictions on what the licensee can do with the patented
invention. An example from the Supreme Court was the General
Talking Pictures case 3 , which involved a license to manufacture
audio amplifiers, but restricted the manufacturer to manufacturing
them for sale for home use. In other words, the patentee was
trying to split up the market between those manufacturing for
home use, where the sales would be at a lower price, and those
manufacturing for commercial use, where the price would
presumably be higher—though there is some issue in the case as to
whether the amplifiers themselves were actually different.
[Slide] Here are more recent examples that will be discussed
today:
The Lexmark case 4 in the Ninth Circuit, in which the use
restriction involved allowed buyers of toner cartridges to use the
cartridge, but not to refill it. So you could only use the cartridge
once and then return it to Lexmark—that is, if you did anything
else with it after using it, you returned it to Lexmark. The
Lexmark 5 case actually involved an option. Lexmark also let you
buy the printer cartridge with the right to refill it at a higher price.

3

General Talking Pictures v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
Ariz. Cartridge Remanufacturers Ass’n v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 421 F.3d 981 (9th Cir.
2005).
5
Id.
4
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I don’t actually know whether anybody ever did buy it—we may
learn that today—at the higher price.
Another case we will be talking about today—two of the
panelists here, Prof. Carstensen and I, were involved in it, in one
way or another—involved a license to plant seed incorporating a
patented gene, but you could only plant the seed in one growing
season. 6 In other words, you couldn’t plant the seed, then harvest
the seeds from the plants, and then plant again the next season.
You had to buy new seed the next season, rather than engaging in
seed saving.
The New York Times had an article about this general issue
about a month or two ago, commenting on the Lexmark case,
which was decided recently. 7 They raised the question: Suppose a
car manufacturer—and a car is certainly going to include some
patented inventions—instead of selling you the car, had a little
license agreement on the car, so that when you took possession of
the car, you didn’t actually own it, but you possessed it under a
license that wouldn’t allow you to sell it as a used car. 8 The Times
hypothesized this as the bottom of the slippery slope, presumably,
in the issue of field-of-use licensing. 9
[Slide] On the previous slide I characterized these things as
licenses. There is some question, particularly as in the New York
Times example, of whether we should characterize them as licenses
or sales. This matters for the purposes of patent law, because the
patent law has a first sale doctrine, or an exhaustion doctrine, that
says that once the item has been sold, then the patentee has no
further patent rights in it. The property rights are exhausted at that
point. Presumably you can still have contractual restrictions, but
you wouldn’t be able to enforce them through infringement suits,
just through breach-of-contract actions. And there would be some
question even about that, because some contractual restrictions
would probably be impermissible under antitrust law, for example.
6
See Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568, 342 F. Supp. 2d 584 (N.D. Miss.
2004), appeal pending, Nos. 04-1532, 05-1120, 05-1121 (Fed. Cir. argued May 1, 2006).
7
J.A. Biersdorfer, By Tearing Open That Cardboard Box, Are You Also Signing on the
Dotted Line?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005, at C4.
8
Id.
9
Id.
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On the other hand, the way the law currently stands, at least in
the Federal Circuit, is that if the patentee’s transfer is under a
license, with a condition, then any use outside the terms of the
license condition is infringement, which converts the breach-ofcontract action into a patent-infringement action, which has
implications for remedies, in terms of attorneys’ fees and perhaps
multiple damages. Moreover, the property protections, then, as
property protections do, carry on down the line to downstream
purchasers.
[Slide] The Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have
couched the terminology of what sorts of use restrictions are
permissible similarly. The Supreme Court says it is “reasonably
within the reward which the patentee . . . is entitled,” 10 and the
Federal Circuit says “reasonably within the patent grant or relates
to subject matter within the scope of the claims.” 11 The Federal
Circuit has said that it may be permissible anyway, if it is not
anticompetitive. But the language that the two courts use is more
or less the same. But that, I think, is largely where the similarity
ends.
[Slide] The Supreme Court hasn’t decided any of these cases
lately, so it is all rather historical. But its approach historically has
been on this distinction between property and contract. This may
be a stretch, but when you read the Supreme Court’s decisions,
they actually seem to use the terms “license” and “contract”
advisedly, in that every license is a contract, but not every contract
is a license. I have argued in an amicus brief—almost convincing
myself—that they use these distinct terms intentionally and mean
to maintain the distinction. 12
In any case, what they have said is that there are several types
of restrictions that would be permissible as a matter of contract, but
would not raise issues of patent law. 13 In other words, you could
sue in a breach-of-contract action, but you couldn’t sue, even if the
contract is breached, for patent infringement. One of the examples

10
11
12
13

General Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 127 (1938).
See, e.g., U.S. Philips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 2001 U.S. Fed. Cir. Briefs 1108 (2002).
Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1316, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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was with a geographical restriction, when a purchaser was, in
effect, evading the geographical restriction of the patentee, and the
Court said maybe the patentee could stop that through contract, but
it could not do it through a patent infringement suit, because once
the first transfer happens to the first purchaser/licensee, that
purchaser can sell it anywhere without being subject to any
restrictions.
The Federal Circuit, on the other hand, has this doctrine about
whether it is within the scope of the patent claims, but it has not
exactly said what that means. It can’t just mean infringement,
because if there were no infringement, then this would never be an
issue. This issue only comes up when the purchaser is using the
invention in some way, and so is, arguably, infringing. There has
to be some narrower category of things—narrower than
infringement—that raises this issue. It is not clear what that is.
The Federal Circuit has written as though the patentee could do
almost anything in the way of use restrictions, though it really
hasn’t held that, and its statements, even, have been not entirely
consistent. So it is a little difficult to know what the law is.
[Slide] So we have the contract/property distinction I mention
below. I think you can read the cases as reflecting this—the
Federal Circuit takes an approach that is all based on contract, that
the nature of the rights transferred is just a matter of the terms of
the license between the patentee and the purchaser. So it is all a
matter of consent of the two parties.
Whereas the Supreme Court—and, again, these are old cases; it
is hard to know what the Court would do now—seems to focus on
the nature of the invention. The invention is the “thing.” I will
come to some ways in which that conception is reflected in the
Court’s opinions in a moment. The Supreme Court focuses on a
contract or quasi-contract between the patentee and society. The
patentee gets exclusive rights, the society gets the information, and
that establishes the patent rights. So the contract is defined by the
claims, in some sense, is defined by the nature of the invention, not
by the contract between the patentee and the licensee.
So the Supreme Court has this whole property conception, and
the downstream restrictions are like restraints on alienation. Once
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you acquire the thing, you are allowed to do whatever you want
with it, and contract does not give the patentee the right to impose
the restrictions, because that would be restraint on alienation. That
is the flavor of the Court’s decisions.
[Slide] One way this comes up is that the Supreme Court has
established that the purchaser of a patented product has the right to
repair it. The language of these cases focuses on the idea that
when you get the product, you get this “thing.” In one of the bestknown cases, you get a convertible top, and when the fabric wears
out, you get to replace the fabric, because you still have the right to
the convertible top, and only part of it is worn out, so you can
repair it, so as to maintain the value of this thing that you acquired
from the patentee.14
The Federal Circuit has said, or at least suggested, in a case
involving a license restriction that said you have the right to use
the invention only once, that if that restriction is valid—it didn’t
hold that it was valid, but it suggested that it was (this is the
Mallinckrodt case 15 )—if that single-use restriction is valid, then
you have basically eliminated the right to repair.
In my view, that can’t be right. When you read the Supreme
Court opinions on the right of repair, nothing suggests that the
patentee could just, by contract, get rid of those. Nothing holds
that they can’t either. So the law is certainly unclear, but it is not
the basic thrust of the opinions. Those Supreme Court repair
opinions, in contrast to some of the other field-of-use opinions, are
actually fairly recent.
[Slide] Finally, downstream restrictions—that is, restrictions
either on the ultimate user of the product or on the second
purchaser of the product. The manufacturing patentee might sell to
a dealer, who then sells to an ultimate consumer.
The Supreme Court has never upheld a use restriction against a
downstream purchaser who bought validly from a licensee. In
General Talking Pictures, 16 it held the final purchaser liable for
infringement, but that was because the licensee had sold in
14
15
16

Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
General Talking Pictures v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
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violation of the terms of the license. The Court made it fairly clear
that that was the reason.
On the other hand, although it has never upheld such an
infringement decision, it has also never rejected one, because it
hasn’t really had the opportunity to do so.
The Federal Circuit, in contrast, has never disallowed a
restriction on a purchaser and generally has suggested that they are
within the scope of the patent. On the other hand, it has never
upheld one either, because it has always remanded for
consideration by the trial court or has rejected a trial court’s
narrow construction of what is permissible.
So there is a huge range between what the Supreme Court has
said is impermissible and what the Federal Circuit has said is
permissible. It is not at all clear where the line is drawn there.
[Slide] So I want to ask, when we think about downstream
restrictions, what should we do? If we can think about how patent
protection typically works, the basic structure is that we are willing
to suffer the higher costs of patented products because they are the
costs of creating the incentive. When you add in the downstream
restriction idea, you add an additional cost in there, I would say—
at least often—which is the uncertainty of subsequent purchasers
of whether they are subject to whatever restrictions were imposed
upstream. The subsequent purchaser, in many cases—like the
farmer in Monsanto 17 —Monsanto licenses its patented invention to
seed partners, who then put the gene in the seeds and then sell it to
the farmer. Monsanto imposes restrictions between itself and the
seed partner about what they can do. Monsanto seeks to impose
restrictions on the farmers as well, by labels on the package. But
depending on how the farmer acquires the seeds, the farmer may
not be party to any contract that puts the farmer on notice of the
restrictions to which it is subject.
That would mean it is not subject to a breach-of-contract
action, but, because the courts have generally held that the
upstream purchaser can only transfer what it has, courts have

17
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568, 342 F. Supp. 2d 584 (N.D. Miss.
2004), appeal docketed, Nos. 04-1532, 05-1120, 05-1121 (Fed. Cir. argued May 1, 2006).
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sometimes held that the downstream purchaser—the farmer—will
be subject to whatever restrictions were imposed upstream, even if
it doesn’t know about them. That is the nature of property rights.
[Slide] The other issue is that downstream restrictions, at least
if there is an intermediate market—say, a dealer market or
Monsanto’s seed partners—downstream restrictions on the farmers
inevitably are going to impose some sort of constraint on what
goes on in that intermediate market. That is something that the
patentee shouldn’t be able to control.
[Slide] If we accept that downstream restrictions pose these
sorts of problems, then we can ask ourselves, why would we allow
them at all? One reason is that they would allow the patentee to
price-discriminate among users. Different users might have
different uses for the invention, and the patentee might want to
charge higher prices for some uses than for others. That would
increase the revenue to the patentee and presumably, therefore,
increase the incentive for creative activity, and that might be good.
The other possibility is that it could allow the patentee to maintain
profits against competition from users. So the users might do
something downstream that would tend to degrade or lessen the
profits of the patentee, and that would be a bad thing, thus reducing
the incentive.
So let’s talk about these for a minute.
[Slide] Price discrimination: The welfare effects of price
discrimination are generally ambiguous. We don’t entirely know
whether it is good. But, maybe more doctrinally, the Supreme
Court has disallowed practices that allow patentees to pricediscriminate. For example, tying arrangements are often used as a
means of price discrimination. The Supreme Court has said,
however, that you cannot use a patented product to tie purchases of
unpatented products, even though the purpose of that may have no
competitive effect in the unpatented product market, but may just
serve to maximize revenue in the patented market.
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The repair right does this as well. Think about Lexmark. 18
The reason that Lexmark wants to impose the no-refill restriction is
so that—or the effect, at least, of imposing the no-refill restriction
is that if you are a heavy user of printer cartridges, the absence of
the ability to refill means you have to go back to Lexmark and buy
more, so they are, effectively, going to be able to charge more to
heavy users of their printer cartridges than to less heavy users of
their printer cartridges and effectively get a price discrimination
scheme there.
[Slide] “Should we allow this?” is the question. I have argued,
in an article several years ago, that for a use restriction to provide
valid price discrimination—that is, price discrimination that we
think should be okay under patent law—the discrimination should
be based on the use of the invention. 19 So I would say that in
Lexmark, if it has inventions related to how you refill the
cartridges, then it makes perfect sense to not allow people to refill
the cartridges. If their inventions with regard to the cartridge are,
say, related to delivery of the toner material from the cartridge, but
have nothing to do with refilling, then the price discrimination that
they are engaging in isn’t related to the difference in the uses of the
purchaser, and is therefore unrelated to the invention, in that sense,
and, I would say, shouldn’t be permissible.
In Monsanto, you could argue that it should have to turn on the
difference between planting for crop—that is, planting a cotton
crop to get the cotton—or planting the cotton crop to get the seeds.
Of course, the act of planting is the same, regardless. As the
Federal Circuit has acknowledged, it just doesn’t make any
difference. 20 You plant the same way, whether you are planting
for a crop or for a seed. 21
[Slide] What about the other reason, profit maintenance? The
way this works is that you can imagine that what happens
downstream can affect the patentee’s profits. The Supreme Court
18
Ariz. Cartridge Remanufacturers Ass’n v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 421 F.3d 981 (9th Cir.
2005).
19
Mark R. Patterson, When Is Property Intellectual? The Leveraging Problem, 73 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1133, 1142–43 (2000).
20
See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
21
Id.
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has said that a patentee can impose downstream license restrictions
that enable it to protect its own profit stream. It may be
competing, in some sense, with the downstream purchasers or the
licensees. In the General Electric case, it said it can control their
prices and restrict what they can do in order to protect its own
sales. 22 It actually wasn’t quite as explicit as that, but that is how
General Electric is generally read.
[Slide] But for that to make sense, the way the downstream
purchaser typically, in these use-restriction cases, competes with
the patentee is by making the product. Now, you don’t need a use
restriction to prevent the downstream purchaser from making the
product. That is illegal under Section 271 of the patent statutes. 23
So you really wouldn’t need a use restriction to do it. For
example, in the Lexmark case, you ask, does Lexmark need to do
this to effectively prevent its purchasers from making new
cartridges by refilling them? 24
That implicates the repair/
reconstruction doctrine. We have a body of law, or at least a
doctrine, that is supposed to deal with this. If it is repair, it is
permissible; if it is reconstruction, that is making the product and it
is impermissible.
So we could deal with that under the
repair/reconstruction doctrine.
Instead, Lexmark is basically evading the repair/reconstruction
doctrine by imposing use restrictions. 25 I would argue that that
shouldn’t be permissible. I have a citation to the Jazz Photo case
there on the slide, in which the Federal Circuit said that, in a
disposable camera, replacing the film cartridge after it is used is
repair, not reconstruction. 26 I am not sure I agree with that
decision on the facts, but at least it suggests the kind of inquiry that
I would think could be made in the Lexmark context as well.
[Slide] Also, a use restriction shouldn’t require the purchaser
to get additional products in order to operate. That is the problem

22

U.S. v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926).
See 35 U.S.C. § 271.
24
See Ariz. Cartridge Remanufacturers Ass’n v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 421 F.3d 981 (9th
Cir. 2005).
25
Id.
26
Jazz Photo Corp. v. ITC, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
23
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in the Monsanto case. 27 In Monsanto, the question would be, if
you require the farmer to purchase seeds every year, then the
farmer is not just purchasing Monsanto’s gene, which Monsanto
does have the right to control, but is also purchasing the rest of the
seed, which was produced by the seed partner. 28 In order, then, to
prevent the competition from the farmer, who is, in effect,
producing seed in competition with Monsanto, you are also
restricting the farmer from doing something else that it is allowed
to do, which is to re-create the portions of the seed that are
introduced by the seed partner and have no intellectual property
protection. In effect, I would say Monsanto is overreaching in its
effort to try to avoid competition.
So I would have concerns about both Lexmark’s and
Monsanto’s practices, though the concerns are animated by
different aspects of the problem.
[Slide] Seeds are weird, though. Seeds are self-replicating.
Lexmark’s toner cartridge does not make new copies of itself, but
seeds do. The Federal Circuit, in the McFarling case, 29 said they
are a special category, which makes sense. Then Judge Gajarsa in
SmithKline 30 said these sorts of things are not patentable at all.
That would make this inquiry quite easy, of course. But I am not
sure I would go that far.
You can see what is going to happen. If Monsanto is not
allowed to impose this one-season-only restriction, it is only going
to be able to sell these things once, because once it makes one sale
of the seeds, the farmers will replant the seeds the next year. It
basically makes the sale one year, and that is it, which means it is
going to have to raise the price considerably that very first year. I
guess Monsanto could argue, “If we do that, the problem is, we are
basically going to lose out in the market. The price is going to be
too high. Farmers can’t afford it. They will have to take out loans
or something.”
27
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568, 342 F. Supp. 2d 584 (N.D. Miss.
2004), appeal docketed, Nos. 04-1532, 05-1120, 05-1121 (Fed. Cir. argued May 1, 2006).
28
Id.
29
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
30
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(Gajarsa, J., concurring).
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I guess one response I have to that is, “So what?” You are not
entitled to a particular pricing technique that will allow you to
maximize your profits under the patent law. You are only allowed
to exclude. So if you are excluding in some illegitimate way, that
is going farther than you ought to be allowed to.
The other answer I would have is, maybe you could get a
process claim, get a process claim to the use of the seeds. There is
still a problem there, in that there might be implied license issues
when you sell the seeds the initial time. But at least then we focus
on what is going on here. We basically focus on whether, in fact,
your implied license would carry through to previous years in a
way that reflects the basic structure of patent law and creates the
proper incentives, rather than allowing contract to impose the
patentee’s view of what patent law ought to do on purchasers. It
would focus us back on the patentee-society bargain, not on the
patentee-licensee bargain. That should generally be the approach
in these cases.
Thank you.
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you, Mark.
Our next speaker is Dick Ulmer of Latham & Watkins, who
was involved in the Lexmark 31 case and might take a different
view.
MR. ULMER: Thank you.
I thought what I might do is just spend ten minutes or so giving
you a thumbnail sketch of the Lexmark 32 case and, in the course of
that, will touch on a few of the points that Prof. Patterson raised.
Lexmark, for those of you who don’t know it, is a company
that was spun off from IBM in 1991–1992. Its primary mission is
to make computer printers, both laser and ink-jet, although the
issues in the case that we are going to be talking about deal solely
with laser cartridges. Lexmark is number two in computer
printers. Number one, by a big margin, is Hewlett-Packard. HP is

31

Ariz. Cartridge Remanufacturers Ass’n v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 421 F.3d 981 (9th Cir.
2005).
32
Id.
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the 800-pound gorilla in this market space, as they would say in
Silicon Valley.
One of the ways that Lexmark has tried to improve its market
position is—it noted that the remanufacturing of the cartridges was
becoming more prevalent. None of Lexmark’s competitors—HP,
Canon, Brother, Epson—was really getting into that
remanufactured cartridge market. So Lexmark said, “We’re going
to do that. Why are we going to do that?”
Number one is for an environmental purpose. It is better to
have cartridges reused than have them end up somewhere in a
landfill.
Number two is that some of the cartridges that were being
remanufactured by the remanufacturing industry, which is largely
kind of a mom-and-pop industry of tens of thousands of small
competitors around the United States and around the world—some
of those cartridges, frankly, aren’t very good. They leak in the
machines, sometimes even destroy the machines. When the user
then goes and opens up the machine and sees that the machine is
broken, they don’t blame the remanufacturer; they blame Lexmark.
They don’t know where the remanufactured cartridge may have
come from. So that was another reason for Lexmark’s desire to get
into remanufacturing.
The third one is, frankly, a desire to make profits, to get into
this market that nobody else was tapping.
How did Lexmark go about doing this? They decided to
institute a label license that requires, as Prof. Patterson said, the
cartridge to be returned to Lexmark only, if people are going to
return it. What the customer gets in return for that is what is called
a “Prebate,” which is a play on the word “rebate” and the word
“pre.” 33 Instead of having to send in a coupon to get your rebate—
this just happened to me the other day. We bought a cell phone for
my daughter, and there is a $50.00 thing you have to send in. Just
before I left to come out here, I said, “Honey, where’s that
coupon?” She goes, “I don’t know.” So we are going to have to
chase the thing down.
33

Id. at 983.
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Lexmark said, “Let’s just give the rebate right up front.” So
you can buy a Prebate cartridge with the license restriction that you
return the cartridge to Lexmark, if you are going to return it. You
can also buy a regular cartridge, without the Prebate restriction.
You will be happy to know that the data shows that about 10 to
15 percent of people do buy the regular cartridge. Because they
are honest, they don’t want to cheat on the license agreement.
What they do is, they have what are called closed-loop systems,
where they remanufacture the same cartridge up to six or seven
times, and thereby recover their costs in that way. So there are
sales of the non-Prebate regular cartridges.
Lexmark was very careful in structuring this program. They
very closely followed the Mallinckrodt case, 34 which was of great
interest to them. The other key case in this field, although it is not
a patent case, is the ProCD case, 35 which, to our mind, is the key
case saying that shrink-wrap, label, click-through licenses are
valid. That was really kind of the first case in that field. The last
time I checked, there are in the range of thirty to forty ProCD-type
cases. There have been a lot of challenges of shrink-wrap licenses,
but I have to tell you that the results have been overwhelmingly in
favor of shrink-wrap licenses. I think the last time I checked, the
margin is about five to one. So shrink-wrap licenses are here to
stay.
What happened next? Lexmark’s program ran for about four
years, and then a group called the Arizona Cartridge
Remanufacturers Association sued Lexmark. This association was
a gathering of these small remanufacturers, who put together a war
chest to sue Lexmark to try to stop this program. Their concern, I
think, was not so much Lexmark as they were afraid that HP and
the other competitors in the market would adopt the same sorts of
programs that Lexmark had adopted.
I said that they put together a war chest. Frankly, it wasn’t a
real big war chest. They didn’t sue under antitrust law or they
didn’t sue for patent misuse, but they sued under a couple of
unique California statutes called Business and Professions Code
34
35

Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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17200 and 17500. 36 These are very, very broad unfair-competition
laws in California, and practitioners there know that it is close to
malpractice not to toss a 17200 claim into any suit you file these
days. It is so broad that it outlaws anything that is “unfair.”
With respect to business-to-business transactions, the
California Supreme Court has trimmed back on that a little, but as
far as consumer transactions go, anything that is unfair is illegal.
You can imagine what kind of trouble that standard causes.
The plaintiffs’ theories, to put it charitably, went through a lot
of evolution in this case. What finally wound up in the Ninth
Circuit was nowhere to be found in anything that they had ever
pleaded. But that’s litigation. We roll with the punches and
address the arguments that are presented when they are presented.
What it was, was essentially a false advertising case. What the
plaintiffs were saying was that Lexmark, by saying that the Prebate
license was legal, was misrepresenting the facts. Our rejoinder to
that was pretty obvious: Whatever you think of the Mallinckrodt
case, 37 it has been the law of the land for twelve years now. We
are just stating the facts. ProCD, 38 at that time, had been the law
of the land for ten years. So we said, this is a pretty simple case.
We can’t possibly be guilty of falsely advertising what is entirely
true.
To my mind, the most interesting issues were raised very late
in the game. In fact, we heard one of them for the first time, I
think, in the oral argument before the Ninth Circuit. They had to
do with, first, the old-fashioned contract notion of privity. The
argument was that the end user/buyer of this cartridge doesn’t have
a contract with Lexmark, according to the plaintiffs. What the
Ninth Circuit said to that was what Judge Easterbrook said to the
ProCD plaintiff back in that case, and that is that what Lexmark
does by having this label license is offers to the buyer, “You can
use this cartridge if you agree to the terms of our license.” So that
is the offer; that is the acceptance; that is the privity.

36
37
38

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, 17500 (1977).
Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d 700.
ProCD, 86 F.3d 1447.
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The other interesting issue had to do with the downstream
issues that Prof. Patterson was talking about earlier. In the
Monsanto cases, 39 Monsanto has a very elaborate system of special
licenses that it has with its seed company partners and then there
are some licenses with the growers. It is all, to my mind, pretty
complex. That simply would not work in a Lexmark-type
situation, because Lexmark sells its cartridges through so many
different distribution channels and so many different types of
distribution channels. So the argument was the one that Prof.
Patterson made, essentially: When you made the first sale to a
distributor, you didn’t have a restriction on that sale, and therefore
that was an unconditional sale and your patent rights evaporate.
Our point to that is a pretty simple one. Everyone in the stream
of commerce who buys that cartridge takes it with that license.
Anybody who opens it—what it says, essentially, is, “Open up this
box, use this cartridge, and you are bound by the license.” That
applies to everyone in the stream. Whether a distributor opened
the box and used it—not common, but it happens sometimes. Our
view is that that solves the downstream problem. Frankly, I view
the license schemes in Monsanto as a little bit of belt-andsuspenders. I don’t think it is that hard. I think that a label license
on a sack of seed would actually be enough.
The other thing that happened in our case was that the
Electronic Frontier Foundation—and Brian has included their brief
in the packet here—filed an amicus brief that invited the Ninth
Circuit to create a circuit split with the Federal Circuit over
Mallinckrodt, saying that Mallinckrodt was wrongly decided. 40
We pointed out that that was all very interesting, but what we
noted was that EFF in its brief never once told the court what kind
of case our case actually was. They never mentioned Business and

39

Monsanto Co. v Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Monsanto v. McFarling, 363
F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568, 342 F. Supp.
2d 584 (N.D. Miss. 2004), appeal docketed, Nos. 04-1532, 05-1120, 05-1121 (Fed. Cir.
argued May 1, 2006).
40
Brief for Elec. Frontier Found. as Amici Curiae, Ariz. Cartridge Remanufacturers
Ass’n v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 421 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-16987), available at
http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/ACRA_v_Lexmark/20040211_amicus.php (last visited
Sept. 16, 2006)

PANEL_1_TRANSCRIPT_091706_CLEAN

2006]

DOWNSTREAM LICENSING RESTRICTIONS

9/17/2006 5:48:05 PM

1043

Professions Code 17200 or 17500. 41 So it was really sort of an
academic exercise on their part. The Ninth Circuit declined to
create a circuit split. I think they dropped a footnote that said,
“This isn’t before us, and for another day, if ever.”
I think that is probably it from my perspective. I guess I would
say, kind of doctrinally—I am just a country lawyer out there in
the trenches, trying to win cases, so I tend not to think of things on
an academic level a whole lot—our basic view of the Mallinckrodt
case is that all it does is bring patent law into line with antitrust
law. 42 When you go and read the Mallinckrodt case, you see that.
The Schwinn 43 and Sylvania 44 cases are cited repeatedly. What
Schwinn and Sylvania did was to hold that restrictions after a sale
were judged under the antitrust rule of reason unless there was
price fixing involved or some sort of tying. Otherwise, a rule-ofreason approach is taken to a restriction after a sale. 45
To our mind, all Mallinckrodt did was to allow patent rights,
the right to exclude, to be treated in the same way as other property
rights. 46 When you step back and think about it, why shouldn’t
that be so? Why shouldn’t freedom of contract also apply in the
patent arena?
I thought, contrary to what the professor said, the Mallinckrodt
case was well-reasoned, well-decided. When you actually go back
and look at the cases that had established this so-called patent
exhaustion doctrine, what they were all about was price fixing or
tying. As the Federal Circuit pointed out, there is not a single one
of them that had to do, really, with anything else. So it was one of
those things in the law that kind of grew up over time, where
nobody was really kind of digging in and saying, what do these
cases really say?
I think I will leave it at that.
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you.
41
42
43
44
45
46

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, 17500 (1977).
Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d 700.
United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49–50.
See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d 700.
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Our next speaker is Peter Carstensen, who is the YoungBascom Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin. He
comes from an antitrust perspective, I believe.
[See article below in lieu of presentation transcript.] 47
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you.
Back in the 1970s, there was a thing called “The Nine No-No’s
of Patent Licensing.” 48 It sounds a though we are trying to get
back to that.
Jay, maybe you are going to take the view from the intellectual
property side and readdress the balance here a little bit.
Jay is a professor at the University of Illinois School of Law
and is an intellectual property lawyer.
[See article below in lieu of presentation transcript.] 49
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you.
The problems presented by self-replication, I think, are
relatively new. Many of the other issues that come up in this area,
though, go back at least 100 years. The idea that a patent right is
exhausted by first sale is something which has been around for a
long time. The contrary idea that the patent owner, when he sells,
because he has the right also to control use (because the patent
right includes the right to use the invention, as well as the right to
make and manufacture it) can impose license conditions, and that
you simply have an implied license by purchase of the item
originally, and that the implied license can be overruled by explicit
provisions—that is the contrary view, which has also been around
for 100 years.
I think we have heard some very contrasting opinions on which
of those two approaches is appropriate.

47

Peter Carstensen, Post-Sale Restraints via Patent Licensing: A “Seedcentric”
Perspective, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1053 (2006).
48
See Bruce B. Wilson, Patent and Know-How License Agreements: Field of Use,
Territorial, Price and Quantity Restrictions, Address Before the Fourth New England
Antitrust Conference (Nov. 6, 1970).
49
Jay P. Kesan, Licensing Restrictions and Appropriating Market Benefits from Plant
Innovation, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1081 (2006).
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Maybe, Peter, you would kick off with your views on that, and
then we can develop it out from there.
PROF. CARSTENSEN: I think maybe I was too reticent about
it.
PROF. KESAN: I have never heard Peter be reticent on
anything.
PROF. CARSTENSEN: I do think that we need to be very
restrictive on the number of circumstances in which the bundle of
rights that go into a patented product or process get severed and
controlled post-sale or after the developer has substantially parted
with dominion and control over the product or process. Jay gave
you a bit more of the agricultural stuff. It is sort of funny—a guy
from Illinois and a guy from Wisconsin coming out to New York
City to talk about crop issues.
PROF. PATTERSON: And Mr. Ulmer said he is just a country
lawyer, too.
PROF. CARSTENSEN: That is right. And I happen to know
that you are from Ohio and have a little bit of a rural background
yourself.
It seems to me that what is required, again, is very cautious
acceptance of the post-sale kind of restriction. I am not prepared
to say they are categorically bad, though I come a lot closer to that
than many people would like.
Again, what was interesting was the way that Jay did not
engage fully with the alternative that I was talking about, except to
say he rather liked it, at the end, when he talked about anybody
with over 150 acres paying the seed cleaner. Seed cleaners are key
players. They are indispensable in cotton. You cannot save
cottonseed without going to a seed cleaner, and you really need to
use a seed cleaner in soybeans if you want to have any success at
all in saving your crop.
So there is a bottleneck through which these things will pass.
The point for competition in the market and competition in
technology is that if you are very restrictive and you say to
Monsanto, “Gee, guys, you have a problem here because of this
replication,” and we, as a matter of patent law, decide that this
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really is the making or the using of the patented product without a
license—and that is a contentious issue, and I am skeptical, myself.
I think that requires Congress to act. Rather than the courts
rewriting what Congress has written in the past, let Congress
resolve that directly.
But at that point, we say, “Okay, you can put your tax on, but it
can’t be in the form of forcing people to buy new seed.” There are
two reasons for that. The price of a bushel of soybeans for use is
about $5.00. That same bushel for use as seed is $12.00. The
farmer has to pay a couple of extra dollars to get the seed cleaned
and prepared for planting. So there is a $5.00 to $7.00 cost savings
that the farmer can get, not by taking one of the technological
innovators out of the market, but by taking a greedy seed company
out of the market.
So to impose, one way or another, fairly strict scrutiny on these
exceptions that you might carve to the “you sold it, you sold it”
kind of standard, is what I personally would see as the much better
strategy, not only for farmer cost savings, but also for
technological innovation. One of the things that happens in
herbicide-resistant genetics—there were three, maybe four
different genetic alternatives out there which had the same
advantage. That is, once it was in your crop, you could blow the
herbicide over the crop, the crop would live, the weeds would die.
Monsanto’s strategy was such that, by guaranteeing that the
seed companies could sell seed without the threat that the farmer
would save seed—and I disagree with Jay on the empirics; saveseed has almost entirely disappeared from soybeans and cotton.
The seed companies now saw that what would happen if you had
competing genetic alternatives that were herbicide-resistant, price
would start to go down. Some of the competitors would, in all
probability, start allowing farmers to replant the seed, with much
lower cost. It actually happened in corn, where there were
competing root worm—I am not getting the name quite right—
technologies—Bt corn. There were competing technologies. The
price of the genetics dropped dramatically, because once it was in
the seed, it was in the seed.
My suggestion here is not, much as I would like to embrace it,
total prohibition of any post-sale restriction as an absolute. If you
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are going to do it, it has to be done very carefully, very
circumspectly, where there is a real interest, and then it has to be
no more anticompetitive, no more exclusionary than absolutely
necessary to accomplish the legitimate objective. My quarrel with
Monsanto 50 and with the other strategies that have the expansive
reading of Mallinckrodt 51 is that it goes way beyond that.
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you. Jay?
PROF. KESAN: Peter makes a couple of interesting points. If
you go and talk to most of the seed producers, they will tell you
that, obviously, it is no good for them to be suing farmers. These
are their ultimate customers, and they have longstanding
relationships with them. Indeed, some of them, as a matter of
policy, refuse to do that. For example, DuPont-Pioneer refuses to
sue ultimate farmers. They may sue seed companies, but they
don’t sue farmers.
There is a whole lot going on in this area. There are other
countries that are experimenting with exactly the sorts of things
that Peter is talking about, where you don’t make farmers pay, but
you make other people in the value chain pay. For example, for
those of you who are not that familiar with this industry, Argentina
is basically the mirror image of the United States in the Southern
Hemisphere, and so northern Argentina looks like southern United
States. The crops that grow there are very similar. They are the
second and third producer of soybean and corn in the world. They
have some very interesting experiences with GM, and they are one
of the few countries that embraced GM in the early 1990s. They
are experimenting with taxes as a way of trying to see that the
large life-science companies are paid in this area.
We can argue about whether it makes economic sense or not,
but the idea here is not to impose the burdens on the farmer. Brazil
is experimenting with payments from elevator operators—that is,
people who actually benefit from the seed. You are the person
who is benefiting from this huge high yield, and so why don’t you
pay?

50
51

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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The idea here is, once again, that there have to be other
mechanisms that can be put in place so that the people who are
innovating are rewarded.
There are obviously contractual issues that I glossed over, in
part because the Monsantos of the world are perfecting their notice
and contracting. So I don’t expect those things to be that much of
an issue anymore. They are learning from not providing proper
notice and so on. But, of course, there are contractual issues.
There are players in the middle who basically buy from the
Monsantos of the world, folks like JEM Ag Supply, in the JEM v.
Pioneer case. 52 In that particular case, the litigation came about
because there were thousands and thousands of Pioneer seed bags
that were found in JEM Ag Supply, and every one of these bags
has a unique number to it, and JEM Ag Supply had not paid for it.
So the relationship between some of these retailers and the
Monsantos and Pioneers of the world is a bit testy. Nevertheless,
there is a lot going on, and there are different ways of trying to get
at the same problem.
MR. RICHARDS: Dick, do you want to add anything?
MR. ULMER: I did read back through those Monsanto cases
the other day. The thing that kind of strikes me about them is that
what we have here is a situation where we have a farmer with
14,000 acres, and this guy is an admitted cheater. He knew what
bargain he had entered into. He didn’t go into court and say, “This
is a bad bargain.” He tried to get around it. He cheated. He saved
the seed. He went out and planted it. I have a hard time feeling
too sorry for him, I have to say.
PROF. KESAN: I entirely agree, and I do commend a Web site
to your reading, if you guys love this stuff.
It is
percyschmeiser.com. Percy Schmeiser is the equivalent of Homan
McFarling in Canada, and his case went up all the way to the
Supreme Court of Canada, where he also lost. But he has this
great Web site. He is greeting all the world officials and so on and
so forth. He is a farmer who is on a crusade. It’s just a lot of fun.
MR. RICHARDS: Mark?
52

J.E.M Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
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PROF. PATTERSON: I just want to respond to a couple of
things that Mr. Ulmer said a moment ago. If an IP owner is
misusing the IP, then ignoring the IP rights is not cheating. It is
true that Mr. Scruggs might have ignored the IP rights, but he did
not feel the IP rights were being used validly—just as was true for
Zeidenberg in the ProCD case. 53
The other thing I wanted to talk about is—Mr. Ulmer, I think,
teed up the issue really well in this idea that Lexmark wanted to
enter the remanufacturing business. I think that is right, and that’s
great that it wants to enter the remanufacturing business. Then it
has this Prebate program. Of course, the Prebate on the cartridge
that you are not allowed to refill is the same as having a surcharge
on the cartridge that you do want to refill. So, basically, they want
to compete in the remanufacturing business, but the way they want
to do it is by requiring those who want to have somebody else refill
their cartridges pay a surcharge, thus putting them at a
disadvantage. So Lexmark wants to compete, but only with the
leg-up that is provided by the surcharge on the refillable cartridges.
The question, I think, is, do you think that the fact that it
manufactures the cartridge should entitle it to get a leg up in the
remanufacturing business? I think some people think that it
should, that basically these cartridges were created by it. This is
sort of Mr. Ulmer’s point; it is a question of the distribution of the
market.
Other people would take the view that the
remanufacturing business is separate from the manufacturing
business—at least it could be, depending on the patent rights—and
thus the fact that it manufactures these cartridges shouldn’t allow it
to have an advantage in the remanufacturing business.
MR. RICHARDS: We have a few minutes for some questions
or comments from the floor, if anybody has any.
QUESTION: My name is Michael Rand, and I am not a
lawyer—at least not yet.
I have two questions. The first is a general set of questions. It
sounds like what is happening here, in terms of overall process, is
that these companies are waging business by law—like waging
53

ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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war, only in this case, waging business by law, or competing. I
realize there might be certain things that can’t be said, but I am just
wondering, overall, if people on the panel know whether the
companies bring in lawyers in the process of product development
and realize what might happen as time progresses—that they might
be sued, that they would have to put aside money to deal with it; if
they design the product in a certain way, it would have legal
implications this way or not have legal implications that way, et
cetera. How much, in the process of doing business, is law
involved?
A second question I have—I guess to the gentleman at the
end—is, when can you go too far? We are hearing now in the
news the Sony case, 54 with the rootkit software, where, in order to
protect their CDs—you made the point, if the CDs could reproduce
at night, they might get upset. They are upset, and now they seem
to have gone too far. I heard a presenter in another conference say
that Sony might have shot itself in the foot, because one division
wants to protect the CDs, but the other divisions want to use opensource software to create new products, and now they can’t
because of all this stuff going on. Can you go too far? Now the
lawyers, of course, are fighting it out, because there could have
been real damage.
MR. RICHARDS: Jay, since half is addressed to you, and I
think you can probably deal with the other half as well, maybe you
will take it.
PROF. KESAN: Can you go too far? That is always a concern.
It is a concern for every person who operates in the patent world.
They will tell you that a lot of times that is why it is very common
in the patent world to go after intermediate players for contributory
infringement and actively inducing infringement—271(b) 55 and
271(c) 56 —instead of going after the direct infringer, because the
direct infringer is very often a customer. Right here we have a
situation where Monsanto is going after the direct customer, but

54
55
56

24/7 Records, Inc. v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 429 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2005).
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2006).
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006).
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DuPont-Pioneer is not. So there is a realization that this is an
issue.
At the same time, I think there is a concern that if you are
going to be slumbering on your IP rights, that is going to create
problems of its own.
PROF. CARSTENSEN: May I say something about the first
part of that question, the lawyer part?
I can’t think of the name of the paper right now, but one paper
that I recall hearing found that there was a correlation between
number of patents and number of lawyers working for a
corporation, but no correlation between the research and
development and the number of patents being sought. That is, the
patents are more a function of the lawyer than of the research and
development.
It is, I think, the case, increasingly, that lawyers are getting
involved earlier in the product-development process, especially
when you do have all these wonderful levers you can pull—shrinkwrap, tag licenses that start imposing restrictions. Then, thinking
through some of the puzzles that Jay is talking about, about the
scope of your entitlements, getting the lawyers involved early here
makes sense.
There is a Wall Street Journal article about lawyers in the
design of cars, where Ford has its lawyers in very early in the
automobile design, explaining the risks, alternatives, and getting
the lawyers’ advice about which risks to take. Apparently, they
did learn something from their Pinto gas tank experience.
MR. RICHARDS: We will take just one more question.
QUESTION: I will start it as a question to Prof. Patterson, but
anyone on the panel can join in. I am just thinking about the
Lexmark cartridge. I don’t know exactly the facts. I am just
spinning it as a hypothetical. The company, Lexmark, keeps all
the expense of the development and all the expense of
manufacturing the cartridge, and it sells the cartridge. That
cartridge is probably a relatively low-margin business. Refilling
the cartridge doesn’t require the capital expenditures. It is a highmargin business. If you will not give Lexmark a leg up on the
secondary market compensation, wouldn’t that require Lexmark to
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raise the price on the initial sale of the cartridge? In the Monsanto
case, if you can sell only one bag of seeds and then you allow them
to resell it and store it, then that bag will be a $100 million bag.
So won’t, in all practicality, it come out the same?
PROF. PATTERSON: Sure. I think that is right, but I don’t
think it’s a problem. We don’t worry when, say, a patentee comes
up with a new invention that has competition out there, and
therefore he is not able to price it where he would like. This is
similar. I think the fact that you have a patent means you can
prevent other people from doing the same thing, but it doesn’t
entitle you to any particular profit level as a result of making the
invention. So the fact that patent law might be structured in such a
way as to let you make less money than you would like to make
does not mean that patent law is structured incorrectly, I would
say.
MR. RICHARDS: As long as the amount you make is
sufficient to enable you to carry on with your innovation. That is, I
think, the balance point which is very difficult to determine and
can only be done empirically, because there is no accurate way of
coming up with it. We see these problems, and maybe sometimes
we try to correct them and sometimes we just let them sit there
until the next generation takes over.
I think that probably is where we have to end this morning.
Thank you all very much. Thank you to the panel. Thank you for
your questions.

